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ABSTRACT
The issue of embedding cost-awareness in the design of com-
munication network devices and protocols has been growing
at a fast rate in last years. Under certain connection situa-
tions, however, network design is not enforced by a central
authority. This is the case, for instance, of power control
for wireless networks, where the cost of a link is a function
of the power needed to send a message to a remote node,
which increases with the distance. Here each player wishes
to consume as few power as possible to send its request and
the main question is how to avoid that players deviate from
a socially optimal network.
In this paper, we study strategic games based on connection
situations with the objective to coordinate self-interested
agents placed on the nodes of a graph to realize a more
efficient communication network. We address the problem
of the design of cost allocation protocols that may guaran-
tee the convergence of the best response dynamic and we
analyze the effects of cost monotonicity and other state-
dependent properties on the optimality of a protocol.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
F.2.2 [Nonnumerical Algorithms and Problems]: Com-
putations on discrete structures; G.2.1 [Combinatorics]:
Combinatorial algorithms
General Terms
Algorithms , Theory
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1. INTRODUCTION
Due to economic and environmental concerns, reducing en-
ergy consumption in telecommunications is a priority, and
the issue of embedding cost-awareness in the design of com-
munication network devices and protocols using game theory
has been growing at a fast rate in last years [27, 6]. In par-
ticular, game theory applied to connection situations seems
to provide a powerful and realistic methodology to analyze
the design of cost allocation protocols. A connection situ-
ation arises when there is a group of agents (e.g. devices
of a communication network) who all want to be connected
with a source 0 (e.g. a server), directly or via other agents,
and where connections are costly (e.g. due to data traffic
costs). Cost sharing problems on connection situations were
introduced by Claus and Kleitman [10] and have been stud-
ied with the aid of cooperative game theory since the basic
paper of Bird [7]. Given a connection situation, Bird [7]
introduced an associated coalitional game (known as min-
imum cost spanning tree (mcst) game), where the players
are the agents placed on the nodes and the cost incurred by
a coalition is the minimal cost of connecting this coalition
to the source via links between members of the coalition.
Since then, many cost sharing protocols have been proposed
in the literature of mcst games [16, 17, 28, 20, 21, 24, 28,
9, 21, 29] with various desirable properties including budget
balance and cost monotonicity.
Budget balance consists of satisfying both cost recovery (i.e.
the cost of the service is recovered from all the players) and
competitiveness (i.e. no surplus is created because if any
surplus is created then a competitor can provide the service
at a cheaper cost by reducing the surplus) [11].
Many papers concerning the analysis of cost allocation pro-
tocols using coalitional games have focused on cost mono-
tonicity properties, meaning that if some connection costs
go down (up), then no agents will pay more (less) (see for
instance [12, 28, 8, 5, 2, 8]). In the paper of [12], for in-
stance, a particular cost monotonic protocol was studied,
where cost monotonicity means that an agent i does not
pay more if the cost of a link involving i decreases, nothing
else changing in the network. The interest for monotonicity
properties for protocols in connection situations is explained
by the fact that in many real applications, connection costs
may increase or decrease with time, and therefore cost allo-
cations which are stable only in the original situation can-
not guarantee the cooperation among agents also under the
new conditions. This is the case, for instance, for telecom-
munication networks, where it may happen that at a given
moment the cost of connections can increase (e.g. as a conse-
quence of an improvement in quality and quantity of services
supplied) or decrease (e.g. by improving telecommunication
technologies). Another reason to analyze cost monotonic-
ity is that it ensures that no customers are motivated to
voluntary increase the cost of adjacent links, since accord-
ing to a cost monotonic allocation protocol no customer will
pay less. Note that this kind of considerations arise from
interaction situations which are based on cooperative mod-
els, where the issue concerning the “strategic” behavior of
players is somehow left to the intuition.
In parallel, since the seminal paper [1], another class of re-
lated problems has been widely studied in the literature of
game theory applied to networks. The basic question of
such problems is to describe an endogenous process of the
formation of communication links, given some underlying
protocol for allocating the benefit of communication, namely
the Myerson value [23]. The paper by Aumann and Myer-
son [1] introduced a model of link formation where links are
constructed sequentially. Later, Myerson [22] introduced a
model of link formation in strategic form where players an-
nounce simultaneously the set of players they would like to
communicate with, and a link between two nodes is formed
if both nodes announce to form it. As in the previous model,
the payoffs of players is calculated according to the Myerson
value. Later, Slikker and van den Nouweland [26] introduced
an extension of such models for link formation that incorpo-
rate costs of formation of communication links (see also [18,
19]). An interpretation of these models with costs of link
formation is that players at first stage incur the costs of link
formation and divide these costs in a fair manner and then,
at a second stage, bargain over the division of the benefits
(see also [25]).
The objective of this paper is threefold. First, we want to
integrate cost allocation protocols for connection situations
with the model of network formation with communication
costs. In this direction, a game in strategic form is pre-
sented where agents are placed on the nodes of a graph and
the strategy of each player is to construct a single link which
connects himself to another node in the network (that may
be another agent or a source). Each link is costly, as in
usual connection situations, and the cost of remaining dis-
connected from the source is larger than any finite cost that
should be supported to guarantee the connection with the
source. So, agents want to be connected to the source at
any cost, but of course they are self-interested to save their
own money. Actually, this strategic game has been already
introduced in [15], but in that paper the authors focused on
a specific cost allocation protocol for trees: the Bird rule
[7] assigning to each player i the cost of the link from i to
the its predecessor on the unique path from the source to
i (see also [13, 3, 4] for other strategic models applied to
connection situations).
The second objective of this paper is to analyze properties
for cost allocation protocols (including but not limited to the
Bird one), and in particular the role of cost monotonicity and
other state-dependent properties in the convergence of the
best response dynamic [14]. Contrary to the situation based
on a cooperative setting, where cost monotonicity seems to
interpret a condition of stability in dynamic situations [20],
we show that cost monotonicity of protocols is incompatible
with the optimality of associated best response dynamics.
Finally, the third and main goal of this manuscript is to
answer an open question concerning the existence of a cost
allocation protocol that guarantees the convergence of each
best response dynamic to a network of minimum connection
cost. This is not the case, for instance, of the cost allocation
protocol based on the Bird rule, which allows for the possi-
bility of Nash equilibria which do not correspond to a graph
of minimum cost [15].
We start in the next section with a brief introduction of the
main notations and the definition of the model of strategic
game applied to connection situations. Section 3 focuses
on the relation between cost monotonicity and the state-
dependent property with the property of optimality for pro-
tocols. Section 4 is devoted to two optimal protocols and
to the analysis of their properties of convergence. Section 5
concludes.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
Let G = (V,E,w) be an undirected, connected and weighted
graph on n = |V | vertices and m = |E| edges where V =
{0, 1, · · · , n − 1} and where each edge e ∈ E has a non
negative weight w(e) ∈ R+. Node 0 is called the root (or
the source) and any other node is an agent who wants to be
connected to 0 either directly or via other nodes which are
connected to 0. For any set of edges E′ we denote by w(E′)
its total weight: w(E′) =
∑
e∈E′ w(e).
As a notation V (.) and E(.) are two functions which desig-
nate the vertex set and edge set of their argument, respec-
tively. The subgraph of G induced by the vertex set V ′ ⊆ V
is denoted by G[V ′].
We consider a strategic game form (V \{0},NG(1)×NG(2)×
· · · × NG(n − 1)) where the strategy space NG(i) of ev-
ery player i ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1} is his neighborhood in the
graph. When a player i plays its neighbor j then the edge
(i, j) is built. A state (or strategy profile) S is a vector
(S1, S2, · · · , Sn−1) ∈ NG = NG(1)×NG(2)×· · ·×NG(n−1).
In the following, S−i denotes S from which the strategy of
player i was removed and (S′i, S−i) denotes the state S from
which Si was replaced by S
′
i.
The edges built by the players and associated with S is de-
noted by E(S) and defined as {(i, Si) : i = 1, · · · , n − 1}.
Let S be any state. We denote by con(S) and dis(S) the
players who are connected and disconnected from the source,
respectively. Let CCS be the connected component of E(S)
that contains the source and E(CCS) be the edges of the
connected component CCS . TS = E(CCS) ∩ E(S). Note
that TS is a tree, since TS is connected by construction and
contains exactly |TS | + 1 vertices. Note also that con(S) is
the vertex set of CCS\{0} and TS = {(i, Si) : i ∈ CCS\{0}}.
We suppose that every player wants to be connected to the
source at the least possible cost. To do so the players interact
with a protocol which, given the strategy profile, allocates
a cost to the players. More formally, given a graph G, a
cost allocation protocol (or, simply, a protocol) is a map c :
(R+)m × NG → (R+)n−1, which assigns to every weight
vector w ∈ (R+)m and every state S ∈ NG a cost vector
(c1(w, S), · · · , cn−1(w, S)) ∈ (R+)n−1 (if the weight function
is clear from the context and no confusion arises we simply
denote it as (c1(S), · · · , cn−1(S))).
A cost allocation protocol c such that
∑
i∈con(S) ci(S) =
w(TS) for every strategy profile S is said budget balanced.
This property implies that the cost of the edges in the net-
work connected to the source is fully supported by its users.
In the remaining of the paper we will focus on budget bal-
anced protocols and the associated strategic games (V \
{0},NG , c).
Given a protocol c, a strategy x ∈ NG(i) is a better re-
sponse of player i with respect to the strategy profile S if
ci(x, S−i) < ci(S). We say that x is a best response when
ci(x, S−i) = miny∈NG(i) ci(y, S−i).
A state S is a Nash equilibrium of the game, if for every
player i, it holds that Si is a better response of player i to
S−i. For a state S and a player i, let NS(i) be the sets
of strategies of player i resulting from a better response of
player i, ie., NS(i) = {j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} : ci(j, S−i) <
ci(S)}; in particular, NS(i) ⊆ NG(i) and S is a NE iff
NS(i) = ∅ for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
A Better Response Dynamic (BRD, also called Nash dy-
namics) (associated with a protocol c) is a sequence of states
S0, S1, . . . , such that each state Sk (except S0) is resulted by
a better response of some player from the state Sk−1. Note
that if a better response dynamic reaches a Nash equilibrium
after a finite number of states, then no further changes of
strategies are expected (if we assume that a player changes
his strategy only if he strictly prefers a different strategy).
3. DYNAMICS OF PROTOCOLS
In this section we are interested in analyzing properties of
cost allocation protocols in connection situations where agents
are continuously prepared to improve their payoff in re-
sponse to changes made by other agents. How should we
design cost allocation protocols to minimize the efficiency
loss caused by selfish players that are only willing to perform
update leading to an immediate reduction of their individual
cost shares?
A natural approach to this problem is the analysis of each
BRD associated with a certain protocol. With this objective,
the following properties should be considered.
Definition 1 (CONV). We say that a cost allocation
protocol converges to an equilibrium iff every associated BRD
reaches a Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 1.
We say that a Nash equilibrium S is efficient iff the cor-
responding graph E(S) is a minimum cost spanning tree
(mcst) (i.e. w(E(S)) equals the minimum cost over all net-
works connecting all nodes in V ).
Definition 2 (OPT). We say that a cost allocation
protocol is optimal iff every associated BRD reaches an effi-
cient Nash equilibrium.
Obviously the OPT property implies the CONV one. The
protocol based on the Bird rule, which charges each player
i in state S with the weight w(i, Si) is budget balanced,
CONV but not OPT [15].
Consider the following property for cost allocation protocols.
Definition 3 (IMON). We say that a cost allocation
protocol is Individually Monotonic iff for every S ∈ NG,
i ∈ con(S) and Ŝi ∈ NG(i)
w(i, Ŝi) ≥ w(i, Si) ⇒ ci(Ŝi, S−i) ≥ ci(S).
Looking at the motivations that justify the interest in mono-
tonicity properties in the cooperative setting, one could erro-
neously argue that individual monotonicity is a good candi-
date property to guarantee the implementation of a network
of minimum cost. However, it is easy to show that there is
no cost allocation protocol which satisfies both IMON and
OPT properties, implying that a large family of cost mono-
tonic solution from the literature on minimum cost spanning
tree games are not optimal in this framework [20].
Proposition 1. There is no cost allocation protocol which
satisfies both IMON and OPT properties.
Proof. Suppose it exists a protocol c which is IMON
and OPT. Consider the instance of Figure 1 and the sub-
optimal strategy profile where player 1 plays 2 while player
2 plays 0. If a player changes his strategy then his cost in-
creases. Indeed, if player 1 plays 0 then his cost increases
by IMON. Meanwhile, if player 2 plays 1 then he is not con-
nected anymore so his cost is infinite. So this state is a Nash
equilibrium but not an efficient one1.
Another property that is particularly valuable in the anal-
ysis of the endogenous formation of networks is the state-
dependent property, saying that the allocation of the cost of
1For illustrative purposes, this proof is based on a situation
with only two players; obviously, the same considerations
apply to situations with more than two players.
the network TS connected to the source in a state S should
not depend on the edges not constructed under S.
Definition 4 (SDEP). We say that a cost allocation
protocol is State Dependent iff for every state S, for every
weight functions w ∈ (R+)m and w′ ∈ (R+)m, with w(e) =
w′(e) for every e ∈ TS, then ci(w, S) = ci(w′, S) for every
i ∈ con(S).
This property allows for the continuous control of the charge
procedure by means of the simple observation of the edges
constructed under state S, without assuming the knowledge
of the weights of the links of the entire network (see for in-
stance the class of construct and charge (CC )-rules in [21]
for a family of cost allocation protocols that meet the re-
quirement of continuous monitoring by the agents involved).
Unfortunately, also this property is incompatible with the
OPT property, as it is shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 2. There is no cost allocation protocol which
satisfies both SDEP and OPT properties.
Proof. By Proposition 1, it is sufficient to prove that if a
cost allocation protocol satisfies SDEP and OPT properties
than it is satisfies IMON property too.
Suppose it does not. This means there exists S, i and Ŝi
such that w(i, Ŝi) ≥ w(i, Si), and ci(w, (Ŝi, S−i)) < ci(w, S).
Take a weight function w′ ∈ (R+)m, where w′(e) = w(e) if
e ∈ TS ∪ {(i, Ŝi)} or if e /∈ E(CCS), and the cost of all
the other edges with vertices in CCS is maxe∈E{w(e)}+ 1.
So the graph TS is the unique optimal tree with respect to
w′. By the SDEP property, we have that ci(w
′, (Ŝi, S−i)) =
ci(w, (Ŝi, S−i)) < ci(w, S) = ci(w
′, S), which yields a con-
tradiction with the OPT property.
Therefore, in order to prosecute in our research for the OPT
property, we must renounce to some interesting and well
studied properties of cost allocation protocols in the cooper-
ative setting, like obligation rules [28], which are cost mono-
tonic, and CC-rules [21], which are state-dependent. Nev-
ertheless, next section shows that optimal budget balanced
protocols exist.
4. TWO OPTIMAL PROTOCOLS
We assume that the edges of G satisfy w(e1) ≤ w(e2) ≤
· · · ≤ w(em). In the following, we always compute a mcst
with Kruskal’s algorithm applied on that edge order.
Let T ∗S be the mcst built using Kruskal’s algorithm on the
subgraph G[con(S)]. We denote by OPTS the total weight
of T ∗S , and by S
∗ a state which corresponds to T ∗S .
We say that a player i ∈ con(S) follows T ∗S in S iff Si = S∗i .
In other words, the strategy of player i is his first neighbor
in the unique path from him to the source 0 in the tree T ∗S .
Let ∆(S) =
∑
e∈E(CCS) w(e) − OPTS ; it is the difference
between the weight of the edges built by the players con-
nected to the source and the minimal weight for connecting
these players.
We propose two protocols. Recall that the cost of a non
connected player is infinite, so to define a protocole we shall
define the cost of connected players (as previously noted, all
the players will be connected in any Nash equilibrium).
In the first protocol, all connected players fairly share the
cost of an optimal network (namely OPTS|con(S)| ) except one player,
denoted by f(S), who is charged OPTS|con(S)| plus the extra cost
of the current state ∆(S).
In the second protocol, all connected players who follow the
optimal strategy profile T ∗S pay according to the Bird rule
while the other connected players (who do not follow T ∗S ) pay
what they should pay in T ∗S with the Bird rule plus an extra
cost. We assume that this extra cost is fairly distributed,
but actually the result holds for any extra cost.
Our protocols rely on a particular set of players: we de-
fine V̂ (S) as the players of con(S) such that Si ̸= S∗i and
con(S) = con(S∗i , S−i). In other words, these players do
not follow T ∗S and if they unilaterally change their strat-
egy to follow it, then the set of connected players remains
unchanged.
Lemma 1. The following properties hold for every state
S: (i) If ∃i ∈ con(S) such that Si ̸= S∗i then V̂ (S) ̸= ∅. (ii)
If dis(S) ̸= ∅, then ∃i ∈ dis(S) such that NG(i)∩ (con(S)∪
{0}) ̸= ∅.
Proof. Let S be a state.
For (i). Take any player i ∈ con(S) such that Si ̸= S∗i .
Removing the edge (i, Si) from E(CCS) provides two con-
nected components CC0 (where the source is) and CCi (where
i is). If S∗i belongs to CC0 then i ∈ V̂ (S) because con(S) =
con(S∗i , S−i). Otherwise S
∗
i ∈ CCi and consider the path,
in T ∗S , from i to the source. Denote by j the last node of
CCi visited when walking from i to 0 on the path. It must
be S∗j ∈ CC0 and Sj ̸= S∗j (otherwise E(CCS) is not a tree).
Thus j ∈ V̂ (S).
For (ii). Assume dis(S) ̸= ∅ and let j ∈ dis(S). Since
G is connected there is a path from the source 0 to j. Let
i ∈ dis(S) be the first encountered vertex of this path when
we start from 0. Hence, an edge (i′, i) belongs to this path
with i′ ∈ (con(S) ∪ {0}).
4.1 An egalitarian protocol
Let f(S) = min V̂ (S) be the node of V̂ (S) with minimum
index if V̂ (S) ̸= ∅ and f(S) = ∅ otherwise (using (i) of
Lemma 1). In the protocol, f(S) is charged OPTS|con(S)| +∆(S)
while any other connected node pays OPTS|con(S)| .
Formally, we get: ci(S) =
OPTS
|con(S)| for i ∈ con(S) \ {f(S)},
cf(S)(S) =
OPTS
|con(S)| +∆(S) if f(S) ̸= ∅ and ci(S) = +∞ for
i ∈ dis(S).
One can observe that the total weight of E(CCS) is always
covered by the connected players, i.e., the protocol is budget
balanced.
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Figure 2: Two connection situations with two
agents, one with symmetric agents and two mcsts
(left side) and one asymmetric agents (right side).
1\2 0 1
0 10, 30 10, 10
2 10, 10 ∞,∞
1\2 0 1
0 10, 50 10, 10
2 30, 10 ∞,∞
Example 1. Consider the connection situations depicted
in Figure 2. Note that on the left side, the agents are sym-
metric in the graph (two nodes i and j are symmetric in
a graph if w(i, k) = w(j, k) for every other node k). As
a consequence, there are two minimum cost spanning trees
of total cost 20: {(1, 2), (0, 2)} and {(1, 2), (0, 1)}. Differ-
ently, in the connection situation on the right side, there is
a unique mcst of cost 20: {(1, 2), (0, 1)}.
The strategic games associated with the protocol introduced
in this section with respect to the mcst T ∗S = {(1, 2), (0, 1)}
and the connection situations depicted in Figure 2 are shown
in the following tables.
Looking at the left table, corresponding to the network de-
picted in Figure 2, left side, we observe that even if players
1 and 2 are symmetric, in state (0, 0) player 2 seems to be
penalized (he pays more than its direct connection to the
source). On the other hand, both Nash equilibria (2, 0) and
(0, 1) are efficient.
Instead, in the right table, corresponding to the network in
Figure 2, right side, we observe that agent 1 is better off
when passing from state (2, 0) to state (0, 0), even if the
weight of the link to edge (1, 2) is smaller than the weight of
edge (0, 1). As expected, the protocol does not satisfy the
IMON property (similarly, we may observe that neither the
SDEP property holds: simply increase the cost of the edge
(0, 1) from 20 to 22 in the network of Figure 2, right side,
all the other costs remaining the same; we have that under
the state (2, 0) the protocol would attribute 29 to player 1
and 11 to player 2).
Proposition 3. Every state corresponding to a mcst is
a Nash equilibrium
Proof. Let OPT be the weight of any mcst. In a state
S corresponding to a mcst, all players pay OPTS/(n− 1) =
OPT/(n−1) because ∆(S) = 0. Thus, no player can deviate
and decrease his cost. Note that f(S) can be non empty if
an optimal solution is not unique.
Proposition 4. Any state S which does not correspond
to a mcst is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If ∆(S) = 0, then TS is a mcst on G[con(S)]
and not on G. So, dis(S) ̸= ∅; By (ii) of Lemma 1, there
is a player i ∈ dis(S) which can play j ∈ con(S). Let
S′ = (S−i, j) be the state resulting of this modification. We
have ci(S
′) < +∞ = ci(S).
If ∆(S) > 0, then the player f(S), who pays OPTS|con(S)| +∆(S),
can play S∗i and pay
OPTS
|con(S)| .
As indicated in the previous sections, we consider the better
response dynamics (BRD), a well known process which starts
from any given state and, while it is possible, let one player
take a better move. We say that BRD converges if it always
ends.
Let Φ be a potential function which maps a state S to the
vector
(|dis(S)|, |E(S∗) \ E(S)|, f(S), |NS(f(S))|)
where we recall that NS(f(S)) is the set if strategies corre-
sponding to a better response for f(S).
A vector X ∈ Nr is lexicographically smaller than another
vector Y ∈ Nr, denoted by X ≺ Y , if one of the following
cases occurs:
• X1 < Y1
• Xi < Yi for some i ∈ {2, · · · , r} while Xj = Yj for all
j < i.
Lemma 2. Let S and S′ be two states which only differ on
the strategy of one player i. If ci(S
′) < ci(S) then Φ(S
′) ≺
Φ(S).
Proof. Player i has taken a better move. Suppose i ∈
dis(S). We get that i /∈ dis(S′) and after i’s deviation, the
number of disconnected players can only decrease strictly,
meaning that Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S).
Now suppose that i ∈ con(S). It is clear that i ∈ con(S′)
since i takes a better move. It immediately follows that
con(S) = con(S′) and OPTS = OPTS′ .
If ci(S) =
OPTS
|con(S)| then there is no way for i to change his
strategy and decrease his cost so we can assume that ci(S) =
OPTS
|con(S)| +∆(S), implying that i = f(S).
If i = f(S) deviates and plays S′i = S
∗
i instead of Si then
|E(S∗) \E(S)| decreases by one unit while |dis(S)| remains
unchanged; thus Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S).
Now suppose that i = f(S) deviates and plays S′i ̸= S∗i .
Then |E(S∗) \ E(S)| and |dis(S)| remain unchanged. In
addition i belongs to V̂ (S′), meaning that f(S) ≥ f(S′).
Either f(S′) < f(S), implying that Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S). Other-
wise f(S′) = f(S). Since i has taken a better move, ci(S) =
OPTS
|con(S)| + ∆(S) >
OPTS′
|con(S′)| + ∆(S
′) = ci(S
′) from which we
1\2 0 1
0 20, 20 20, 0
2 20, 0 ∞,∞
1\2 0 1
0 20, 40 20, 0
2 40, 0 ∞,∞
deduce that ∆(S) > ∆(S′) because OPTS = OPTS′ and
con(S) = con(S′). Since the strategies of other players re-
mains unchanged, it follows that NS′(f(S
′)) ⊂ NS(f(S)),
implying |NS′(f(S′))| < |NS(f(S))|; thus Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S).
Theorem 1. BRD always converges after at most ∆(G)n3
rounds where ∆(G) is the maximum degree of the graph G.
Proof. Using Lemma 2, each state S is immediately fol-
lowed by another state S′ such that Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S). Thus
BRD can not run into a cycle. Since a finite number of
states exists, there is at least one minimal state for ≺, mean-
ing that BRD always converge. Now, since for any state S,
|dis(S)| ≤ n− 1, |E(S∗) \E(S)| ≤ n− 1, f(S) ≤ n− 1 and
|NS(f(S))| ≤ ∆(G), and Φ(S) always decreases lexicograph-
ically when the player who deviates plays a better response,
then BRD converges after at most ∆(G)(n− 1)3 rounds.
Corollary 1. BRD converges after at most n3 rounds if
the players play their best response.
Proof. Consider the function Ψ which maps any state S
to the vector (|dis(S)|, |E(S∗)\E(S)|, f(S)). First, observe
that either a disconnected vertex chooses to be connected,
or the connected vertex f(S) chooses to follow a strategy
leading to a new state S′ with f(S′) ̸= f(S) because f(S)
plays a best response. Since |dis(S)|, |E(S∗) \ E(S)| and
f(S) range from 0 to n− 1, there are at most n3 values for
Ψ(S).
4.2 A Bird’s like protocol
In this second protocol, the costs of players are given by:
• If i ∈ dis(S), then ci(S) = +∞,
• If i ∈ con(S) \ V̂ (S), then ci(S) = w(i, Si),
• If i ∈ V̂ (S), then ci(S) = w(i, S∗i )+ ∆(S)|V̂ (S)| = w(i, Si)+
∆(S)
|V̂ (S)| where ∆(S) = w(TS)−OPTcon(S) (actually here,
we can take any cost function w(i, S∗i )+gi(S) such that
(i) gi(S) > 0 and (ii)
∑
i∈con(S) gi(S) = ∆(S).
Note that the protocol is clearly budget balanced.
Example 2. Consider again the connection situations de-
picted in Figure 2.
The strategic games associated with the protocol introduced
in this section with respect to the mcst T ∗S = {(1, 2), (0, 1)}
and the connection situations depicted in Figure 2 are shown
in the following tables.
Looking at the left table, corresponding to the network de-
picted in Figure 2, left side, we observe that even if players
1 and 2 are symmetric, both Nash equilibria (2, 0) and (0, 1)
are efficient and correspond to the allocation provided by
the Bird rule under the network T ∗S , which strongly penal-
izes player 2 in the NE (2, 0) where the mcst {(1, 2), (0, 2)}
is constructed.
Again, in the right table, corresponding to the network in
Figure 2, right side, we observe that the protocol does not
satisfy the IMON property, passing from state (2, 0) to state
(0, 0).
Proposition 5. Every state corresponding to a mcst is
a Nash equilibrium
Proof. Assume that it is not the case. Thus, there is
an optimal state R (with w(TR) = OPT ) and another state
S = (R−i, j) such that ci(S) < ci(R). Note that ∆(R) = 0
so ci(R) = w(i, Ri). ci(S) is finite so i is still connected
and con(S) = V \ {0}. The spanning trees TR and TS differ
only on one edge (w(i, Ri) in TR and w(i, Si) in TS) so by
optimality of TR we get that w(i, Ri) ≤ w(i, Si). We have
ci(R) = w(i, Ri) ≤ w(i, Si) ≤ ci(S), contradiction.
Proposition 6. Any state S which does not correspond
to a mcst is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume con(S) = V since otherwise by (ii) of
Lemma 1 S is clearly not a Nash equilibrium.
Hence, V̂ (S) ̸= ∅ by (i) of Lemma 1 (w(TS) ̸= OPT and
con(S) = V \ {0}). Then, there exists i ∈ V̂ (S) such that
(TS ∪ {(i, S∗i )}) \ {(i, Si)} is a spanning tree. Consider the
state S′ = (S−i, S
∗
i ). Now, we have i /∈ V̂ (S′); so ci(S′) =
w(i, S∗i ). On the other hand, i ∈ V̂ (S) implies ci(S) =
w(i, S∗i ) +
∆(S)
|V̂ (S)| > w(i, S
∗
i ) because w(TS) > OPT . Hence,
ci(S
′) < ci(S).
In any case, S is not a NE and the result is proved.
Let Φ(S) = (|dis(S)|, |V̂ (S)|,
∑
i∈V̂ (S) |ES(i)|) be a poten-
tial function, where ES(i) = {j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} : w(i, j) <
w(i, Si)}.
Lemma 3. Let S and S′ be two states which only differ
on the strategy of a player i. If ci(S
′) < ci(S) then Φ(S
′) ≺
Φ(S).
Proof. Player i has taken a better move. Suppose i ∈
dis(S). We get that i /∈ dis(S′) and after i’s deviation, the
number of disconnected players can only decrease strictly,
meaning that Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S).
Now suppose that i ∈ con(S). Obviously, con(S) = con(S′).
We prove that i ∈ V̂ (S). Otherwise, i ∈ con(S) \ V̂ (S) and
then, ci(S) = w(i, Si) = w(i, S
∗
i ). Now, if i changes its
strategy, then i ∈ V̂ (S′), and ci(S′) = w(i, S∗i ) + ∆(S
′)
|V̂ (S′)| ≥
w(i, S∗i ) = ci(S), contradiction.
Hence, i ∈ V̂ (S) and then, ci(S) = w(i, S∗i ) + ∆(S)|V̂ (S)| . Two
possibilities, either i ∈ con(S′) \ V̂ (S′) or i ∈ V̂ (S′).
• If i ∈ con(S′)\ V̂ (S′) = con(S)\ V̂ (S′), then |V̂ (S′)| =
|V̂ (S)| − 1. Hence, Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S).
• If i ∈ V̂ (S′), then ci(S′) = w(i, S∗i ) + ∆(S
′)
|V̂ (S′)| . Ob-
serve that V̂ (S′) = V̂ (S). Since ci(S
′) < ci(S) by
hypothesis, we deduce that ∆(S′) < ∆(S). Thus,
w(i, S′i) < w(i, Si) which means |ES′(i)| < |ES(i)|.
On the other hand, ∀j ∈ V̂ (S) \ {i}, ES′(j) = ES(j).
In conclusion,
∑
j∈V̂ (S′) |ES′(j)| <
∑
j∈V̂ (S) |ES(j)|
and Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S).
In any case, Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S).
Theorem 2. BRD always converges after at most mn2
rounds, where m is the number of edges of G.
Proof. Using Lemma 3, each state S is immediately fol-
lowed by another state S′ such that Φ(S′) ≺ Φ(S). Thus BRD
can not run into a cycle. Since a finite number of states ex-
ists, there is at least one minimal state for ≺, meaning that
BRD always converge. Now, since for any state S, |dis(S)| ≤
n − 1, |V̂ (S)| ≤ n − 1 − |dis(S)| and
∑
j∈V̂ (S) |ES(j)| ≤
mS ≤ m, then BRD converges after at most mn
2
2
rounds.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have studied cost allocation protocols for
connection situations in a strategic setting. We have pre-
sented a model that can be easily adapted to the model of
network formation on communication graphs, and we have
analyzed properties for protocols in relation the the conver-
gence of the best reply dynamics to efficient Nash equilibria.
These properties have driven our analysis to the definition of
two optimal budget balanced protocols. As a consequence,
the question concerning the existence of optimal protocols
has been positively answered in this paper.
The method used to define our protocols might lead to the
definition of many other optimal protocols, depending on
the rule according to which the cost of a mcst is allocated
among the players. As illustrated by numerical examples,
the inherent limitations of the optimal protocols proposed
in this paper is that symmetric players may be treated differ-
ently, depending on the choice of an a priori selected mcst.
The question about the existence of optimal protocols which
treat symmetric players in a more equitable manner remains
open.
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